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Joe Orthodox
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 Posted: Tue Aug 19, 2008 7:22 am Post subject: South Ossetia Isn't Kosovo, by Christopher Hitchens |
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http://www.slate.com/id/2197704/
South Ossetia Isn't Kosovo
Whatever Moscow says, there are at least six significant differences
between the two situations.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Aug. 18, 2008, at 12:00 PM ET
While it is almost certainly true that Moscow's action in the Ossetian
and (for good measure) the Abkhazian enclave of Georgia has been, in a
real sense, the revenge for the independence of Kosovo (on Feb. 14
Vladimir Putin said publicly that Western recognition of Kosovar
independence would be met by intensified Russian support for irredentism
in South Ossetia), it is extremely important to bear in mind that this
observation does not permit us the moral sloth of allowing any
equivalence between the two dramas.
Perhaps one could mention just some of the more salient differences?
1. Russia had never expressed any interest in Ossetian or Abkhazian
micronationalisms, while Georgia was an integral part of the Soviet
Union. It is thus impossible to avoid the suspicion that these small
peoples are being used as "strategic minorities" to negate the
independence of the larger Georgian republic and to warn all those with
pro-Russian populations on their soil of what may, in turn, befall them.
This is like nothing so much as Turkish imperialism in Cyprus and Thrace
and Iraq, where local minorities can be turned on and off like a faucet
according to the needs of the local superpower.
2. Kosovo, which was legally part of Yugoslavia but not of Serbia was
never manipulated as part of the partition or intervention plan of
another country—the United States, in fact, spent far too long on the
pretense that the Yugoslav federation could be saved—and, for a lengthy
period, pursued its majority-rule claims by passive resistance and other
nonviolent means. NATO intervention occurred only when Serbian forces
had resorted to mass deportation and full-dress ethnic "cleansing."
Whatever may be said of Georgia's incautious policy toward secessionism
within its own internationally recognized borders, it does not deserve
comparison with the lawless and criminal behavior of the Slobodan
Milosevic regime. And in any case, it is unwise for Moscow to be making
the analogy, since it supported Milosevic at the time and has excused
him since on the less-than-adorable grounds (barely even disguised in
Russian propaganda) of Christian Orthodox solidarity. It also armed and
incited the most extreme and least pacifist forces in Ossetia and Abkhazia.
3. Does anybody remember the speeches in which the Russian ambassador
to the United Nations asked the General Assembly or Security Council to
endorse his country's plan to send land, air, and sea forces deep into
the territory and waters of a former colony that is now a U.N. member
state? I thought not. I look at the newspaper editorials every day,
waiting to see who will be the first to use the word unilateral in the
same sentence as the name Russia. Nothing so far. Yet U.N. Resolution
1441, warning Saddam Hussein of serious consequences, was the fruit of
years of thwarted diplomacy and was passed without a dissenting vote.
4. The six former constituent republics of Yugoslavia, which all
exercised their pre-existing constitutional right to secede from rule by
Belgrade, are seated as members of the United Nations, as, indeed, is
Georgia. Twenty out of 27 states of the European Union have also
recognized the government of Kosovo as an entity de jure as well as de
facto. The Kosovar population is estimated at 1.8 million, which makes
it larger than that of some existing E.U. member states. Does anyone
seriously imagine that Russia ever even remotely intends to sponsor any
statehood claims for the tiny local populations of Ossetia and Abkhazia?
On the contrary, these peoples will be reassimilated into the Russian
empire. So any comparison with Kosovo would have to be not to its
breaking away but to its potential absorption and annexation by Albania.
And nobody has even proposed this, let alone countenanced the unilateral
stationing of Albanian armed forces on Kosovar soil.
5. Heartbreakingly difficult though the task has been, and remains, the
whole emphasis of Western policy in the Balkans has been on
de-emphasizing ethnic divisions; subsidizing cities and communities that
practice reconciliation; and encouraging, for example, Serbs and
Albanians to cooperate in Kosovo. One need not romanticize this policy,
but it would nonetheless stand up to any comparison with Russian
behavior in the Caucasus (and indeed the Balkans), which is explicitly
based on an outright appeal to sectarianism, nationalism, and—even
worse—confessionalism.
6. The fans of moral equivalence may or may not have noticed this, but
the obviously long-meditated and coordinated Russian military
intervention in Georgia comes in the same month as explicit threats to
the sovereignty of Poland and Ukraine, and hard on the heels of a
Russian obstruction of any U.N. action in the case of Zimbabwe. Those
who like to describe Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry
Medvedev as reacting to an "encirclement" of Russia may wish to spill
some geopolitical ink on explaining how Kosovo forms part of this
menacing ring of steel—or how the repression of the people of Zimbabwe
can assist in Moscow's breakout strategy from it.
If it matters, I agree with the critics who say that the Bush
administration garnered the worst of both worlds by giving the Georgians
the impression of U.S. support and then defaulting at the
push-comes-to-shove moment. The Clintonoids made exactly that mistake
with Serbian aggression a decade and more ago, giving the Bosnians hope
and then letting them be slaughtered until the position became
untenable—and then astoundingly, and even after the Dayton Accords,
repeating the same series of dithering errors in the case of Kosovo. The
longer the moment of truth was postponed, the worse things became. But
this in itself argues quite convincingly that there was no deliberate
imperial design involved. Will anyone say the same about Putin's
undisguised plan for the forcible restoration of Russian hegemony all
around his empire's periphery? It would be nice to think that there was
a consistent response to this from Washington, but I would not even bet
someone else's house on the idea, which is what President Bush has given
the strong impression of doing in the low farce and frivolity of the
last two weeks. |
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AGGreen
Guest
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| Posted: Tue Aug 19, 2008 8:02 am Post subject: Re: South Ossetia Isn't Kosovo, by Christopher Hitchens |
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***Good prespective article, Joe. thanks.
Al
"Joe Orthodox" <spambucket@spaminator.net> wrote in message
news:g8dap7$a87$2@aioe.org...
| Quote: | http://www.slate.com/id/2197704/
South Ossetia Isn't Kosovo
Whatever Moscow says, there are at least six significant differences
between the two situations.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Aug. 18, 2008, at 12:00 PM ET
While it is almost certainly true that Moscow's action in the Ossetian and
(for good measure) the Abkhazian enclave of Georgia has been, in a real
sense, the revenge for the independence of Kosovo (on Feb. 14 Vladimir
Putin said publicly that Western recognition of Kosovar independence would
be met by intensified Russian support for irredentism in South Ossetia),
it is extremely important to bear in mind that this observation does not
permit us the moral sloth of allowing any equivalence between the two
dramas.
Perhaps one could mention just some of the more salient differences?
1. Russia had never expressed any interest in Ossetian or Abkhazian
micronationalisms, while Georgia was an integral part of the Soviet Union.
It is thus impossible to avoid the suspicion that these small peoples are
being used as "strategic minorities" to negate the independence of the
larger Georgian republic and to warn all those with pro-Russian
populations on their soil of what may, in turn, befall them. This is like
nothing so much as Turkish imperialism in Cyprus and Thrace and Iraq,
where local minorities can be turned on and off like a faucet according to
the needs of the local superpower.
2. Kosovo, which was legally part of Yugoslavia but not of Serbia was
never manipulated as part of the partition or intervention plan of another
country—the United States, in fact, spent far too long on the pretense
that the Yugoslav federation could be saved—and, for a lengthy period,
pursued its majority-rule claims by passive resistance and other
nonviolent means. NATO intervention occurred only when Serbian forces had
resorted to mass deportation and full-dress ethnic "cleansing." Whatever
may be said of Georgia's incautious policy toward secessionism within its
own internationally recognized borders, it does not deserve comparison
with the lawless and criminal behavior of the Slobodan Milosevic regime.
And in any case, it is unwise for Moscow to be making the analogy, since
it supported Milosevic at the time and has excused him since on the
less-than-adorable grounds (barely even disguised in Russian propaganda)
of Christian Orthodox solidarity. It also armed and incited the most
extreme and least pacifist forces in Ossetia and Abkhazia.
3. Does anybody remember the speeches in which the Russian ambassador to
the United Nations asked the General Assembly or Security Council to
endorse his country's plan to send land, air, and sea forces deep into the
territory and waters of a former colony that is now a U.N. member state? I
thought not. I look at the newspaper editorials every day, waiting to see
who will be the first to use the word unilateral in the same sentence as
the name Russia. Nothing so far. Yet U.N. Resolution 1441, warning Saddam
Hussein of serious consequences, was the fruit of years of thwarted
diplomacy and was passed without a dissenting vote.
4. The six former constituent republics of Yugoslavia, which all
exercised their pre-existing constitutional right to secede from rule by
Belgrade, are seated as members of the United Nations, as, indeed, is
Georgia. Twenty out of 27 states of the European Union have also
recognized the government of Kosovo as an entity de jure as well as de
facto. The Kosovar population is estimated at 1.8 million, which makes it
larger than that of some existing E.U. member states. Does anyone
seriously imagine that Russia ever even remotely intends to sponsor any
statehood claims for the tiny local populations of Ossetia and Abkhazia?
On the contrary, these peoples will be reassimilated into the Russian
empire. So any comparison with Kosovo would have to be not to its breaking
away but to its potential absorption and annexation by Albania. And nobody
has even proposed this, let alone countenanced the unilateral stationing
of Albanian armed forces on Kosovar soil.
5. Heartbreakingly difficult though the task has been, and remains, the
whole emphasis of Western policy in the Balkans has been on de-emphasizing
ethnic divisions; subsidizing cities and communities that practice
reconciliation; and encouraging, for example, Serbs and Albanians to
cooperate in Kosovo. One need not romanticize this policy, but it would
nonetheless stand up to any comparison with Russian behavior in the
Caucasus (and indeed the Balkans), which is explicitly based on an
outright appeal to sectarianism, nationalism, and—even
worse—confessionalism.
6. The fans of moral equivalence may or may not have noticed this, but
the obviously long-meditated and coordinated Russian military intervention
in Georgia comes in the same month as explicit threats to the sovereignty
of Poland and Ukraine, and hard on the heels of a Russian obstruction of
any U.N. action in the case of Zimbabwe. Those who like to describe Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev as reacting to an
"encirclement" of Russia may wish to spill some geopolitical ink on
explaining how Kosovo forms part of this menacing ring of steel—or how the
repression of the people of Zimbabwe can assist in Moscow's breakout
strategy from it.
If it matters, I agree with the critics who say that the Bush
administration garnered the worst of both worlds by giving the Georgians
the impression of U.S. support and then defaulting at the
push-comes-to-shove moment. The Clintonoids made exactly that mistake with
Serbian aggression a decade and more ago, giving the Bosnians hope and
then letting them be slaughtered until the position became untenable—and
then astoundingly, and even after the Dayton Accords, repeating the same
series of dithering errors in the case of Kosovo. The longer the moment of
truth was postponed, the worse things became. But this in itself argues
quite convincingly that there was no deliberate imperial design involved.
Will anyone say the same about Putin's undisguised plan for the forcible
restoration of Russian hegemony all around his empire's periphery? It
would be nice to think that there was a consistent response to this from
Washington, but I would not even bet someone else's house on the idea,
which is what President Bush has given the strong impression of doing in
the low farce and frivolity of the last two weeks. |
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